Slippery slopes of stress: ordered failure events in German banking by Koetter, Michael & Kick, Thomas
Slippery slopes of stress:
ordered failure events in German banking
Thomas Kick
(Deutsche Bundesbank and Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
Michael Koetter
(University of Groningen, Deutsche Bundesbank and Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
Discussion Paper
Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies
No 03/2007
Discussion Papers represent the authors’ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff. 
 
 
Editorial Board:   Heinz  Herrmann 
    Thilo  Liebig 

















Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main,  
Postfach  10 06 02, 60006 Frankfurt am Main 
 
Tel +49  69 9566-1 
Telex within Germany  41227, telex from abroad  414431 
 
Please address all orders in writing to: Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Press and Public Relations Division, at the above address or via fax  +49 69 9566-3077
Internet http://www.bundesbank.de  
Reproduction permitted only if source is stated. 
ISBN  978-3–86558–263–8  (Printversion) 
ISBN  978-3–86558–264–5  (Internetversion) Abstract
Outright bank failures without prior indication of ￿nancial instability are very rare.
Supervisory authorities monitor banks constantly. Thus, they usually obtain early
warning signals that precede ultimate failure and, in fact, banks can be regarded as
troubled to varying degrees before outright closure. But to our knowledge virtually
all studies that predict bank failures neglect the ordinal nature of bank distress.
Exploiting the distress database of the Deutsche Bundesbank we distinguish four
di￿erent distress events that banks experience. Only the worst entails a bank to
exit the market. Weaker orders of distress are, ￿rst, compulsory noti￿cations of the
authorities about potential problems, second, corrective actions such as warnings and
hearings and, third, actions by banking pillar’s insurance schemes. Since the four
categories of hazard functions are not proportional, we specify a generalized ordered
logit model to estimate the respective probabilities of distress simultaneously. Our
model estimates each set of probabilities with high accuracy and con￿rms, ￿rst, the
necessity to account for di￿erent kinds of distress events and, second, the violation
of the proportional odds assumption implicit in most limited dependent analyses of
bank failure.
Keywords: Bank, failure, distress, generalized ordered logit
JEL: C35, G21, G33, K23, L50Non-technical summary
Bank insolvencies are di￿erent from failures of non-￿nancial ￿rms because they may
disrupt trust in the banking system as a whole. This explains why banks are subject
to more regulatory scrutiny compared to most other industries. Supervisors therefore
monitor banks on an ongoing basis to ensure the ￿nancial safety and soundness of
individual banks and the system. To this end, they use among other things o￿-site
monitoring systems, which rely mostly on bank-speci￿c ￿nancial data reported to
the authorities. These so-called hazard rate models predict the probability of default
of individual banks on the basis of historical ￿nancial and default data.
Obviously, the de￿nition of default is crucial to such analyses. On the one hand,
banks are subject to clear-cut failure de￿nitions, such as minimum capital require-
ments stipulated in laws and regulations. On the other hand, the systemic dangers
of bank defaults in conjunction with an ongoing supervision process suggest that
regulators, and practitioners, may regard a bank as troubled much earlier than ulti-
mate default in the form of (forced) market exit occurs. We argue in this paper that
most bank hazard studies neglect this ordinal nature of what we prefer to de￿ne as
distress rather than default.
We address the issue by using data on a number of distress events that German
universal banks from all three pillars experienced between 1994 and 2004. We cat-
egorize these events into four groups of ascending degrees of distress, ranging from
early warning information issued by banks to regulators to absorbing events such as
closure and restructuring mergers. To account for this pecking order of events, we
specify a generalized ordered logit model to predict probabilities of di￿erent distress
events simultaneously. Our main ￿ndings are fourfold.
First, we reject the traditionally employed binomial hazard rate model that pools
all distress events without further quali￿cation in favor of an ordered logit model
that explicitly allows for an ordered categorical variable of distress.
Second, we further ￿nd that not only the level of hazard functions di￿ers sig-
ni￿cantly across distress events but also the sensitivity of individual components
of banks’ ￿nancial pro￿les as captured by capitalization, asset quality, manage-
ment skill, earnings, liquidity (CAMEL) and regional macroeconomic covariates.
We report evidence that individual slope coe￿cients, though not all of them, are
signi￿cantly di￿erent across distress categories.
Third, the most important added value of this model in terms of policy relevant
information is the result that some components of ￿nancial pro￿les a￿ect earlier
stages of distress stronger. An example of this is managerial skill approximated with
stochastic cost frontier e￿ciency. Other components are particularly important to
explain the worst classes of distress, especially total reserve holdings and the share
of customer loans.
Fourth, to assess the economic signi￿cance of our results we also report marginal
e￿ects since coe￿cient estimates of hazard rate models alone can be misleading. The
relevance of using a generalized ordered model is further underpinned by at times
substantially di￿erent predictions of probabilities of distress of up to 60 basis points
relative to a simple ordered logit. In sum, we suggest that future hazard rate studies
should attempt to model di￿erent degrees of distress more explicitly.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Bankinsolvenzen unterscheiden sich von Insolvenzen au￿erhalb des Finanzwesens,
da sie das Vertrauen in das Finanzsystem beeintr￿chtigen k￿nnen. Au￿erdem k￿n-
nen durch sie schwerwiegende R￿ckkoppelungen auf die Realwirtschaft ausgel￿st
werden. Darum werden Banken einer intensiveren Aufsicht unterzogen, als dies f￿r
die Mehrzahl anderer Branchen der Fall ist. Die Bankenaufsicht ￿berwacht Institute
kontinuierlich, um die Stabilit￿t einzelner Banken und des gesamten Systems sicher
zu stellen. Hierzu werden unter anderem statistische Methoden genutzt, um durch
die Kombination von historischen Ausfalldaten mit bankspezi￿schen Kennzahlen die
Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit einer Bank vorherzusagen.
Das Verst￿ndnis des Ausfallbegri￿s ist hierbei von o￿ensichtlicher Bedeutung.
Einerseits sind Bankenausf￿lle in Gesetzen und Richtlinien eindeutig geregelt, zum
Beispiel durch Mindesteigenkapitalanforderungen. Andererseits legen die systemi-
schen Gefahren von Bankinsolvenzen in Verbindung mit der kontinuierlichen Banken-
aufsicht nahe, dass Aufsichtsbeh￿rden und Praktiker eine Bank als problematisch
einstufen k￿nnen, deutlich bevor diese faktisch insolvent wird und aus dem Markt
ausscheiden muss. Wir schlagen in dieser Studie ein Modell vor, welches die ordinale
Sortierung problematischer Ereignisse (anstatt von "Ausf￿llen") ber￿cksichtigt.
Hierzu nutzen wir einen Katalog unterschiedlicher Ereignisse, welche sich bei
deutschen Universalbanken aller drei S￿ulen zwischen 1994 und 2004 ereignet haben.
Wir kategorisieren vier Gruppen problematischer Ereignisse, welche in ihrer Schwere
von Fr￿hwarnsignalen in Form von Mitteilungen der regulierenden Beh￿rden einer-
seits, bis hin zu absorbierenden Ereignissen wie Fusionen andererseits reichen. Em-
pirisch ber￿cksichtigen wir diese Ordnung nach Schwere der Ereignisse mit Hilfe
eines ordered logit Modells. Unsere Hauptergebnisse sind wie folgt:
Erstens lehnen wir die Hypothese eines binomialen Hazardratenmodells ab. Statt
dessen unterst￿tzen unsere empirischen Ergebnisse die Wahl eines ordered logit Mo-
dells, welches die aufsteigende Schwere von Ereignissen explizit zul￿sst.
Zweitens zeigen wir, dass nicht nur die Achsenabschnitte je Problemkategorie
variieren, sondern auch einige, wenngleich nicht alle, Steigungsparameter der Ha-
zardfunktionen je Kategorie signi￿kant unterschiedlich sind. Je nach Schwere des
Ereignisses reagieren somit die jeweiligen Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten der einzel-
nen Problemkategorien unterschiedlich sensitiv auf eine identische ˜nderung indi-
vidueller Komponenten des Finanzpro￿ls einer Bank.
Das dritte Ergebnis weist auf die unterschiedliche Bedeutung einzelner Finanzpro-
￿lkomponenten f￿r unterschiedliche Problemereignisse hin und k￿nnte damit von
besonderer praktischer Relevanz sein. Wir zeigen, dass schwache Ereignisse insbeson-
dere von der Qualit￿t des Managements (gemessen mittels stochastischer Kosten-
e￿zienz) abh￿ngen. Letztere ist jedoch von nachrangiger Bedeutung f￿r schwerere
Ereignisse, welche vielmehr von der Reservehaltung und der Kreditqualit￿t deter-
miniert werden.
Viertens berechnen wir marginale E￿ekte, um die ￿konomische Signi￿kanz un-
serer Ergebnisse aufzuzeigen. Unsere Spezi￿kation eines ￿exiberen Modells wird zu-
dem dadurch best￿tigt, dass im Vergleich zu einem restriktiveren Hazardmodellgesch￿tzte Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten um bis zu 60 Basispunkte abweichen k￿n-
nen. Insgesamt schlagen wir daher vor, in Zukunft den Versuch zu unternehmen,
unterschiedliche Problemereignisse explizit zu modellieren.
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1 Introduction
Monitoring and promoting the stability and soundness of banking systems is one
of the major concerns of international policy makers (see for example the Bank for
International Settlements (1999; 2003; 2004), the European Central Bank (2005),
the International Monetary Fund (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996; Dell’Ariccia et al.,
2005), the Bank of England (Hoggarth et al., 2004), Deutsche Bundesbank (2005)
or the Federal Deposit Insurance Scheme (King et al., 2005)). Beginning with the
work of Sinkey (1975), Martin (1977) and Altman (1977) on failures of U.S. banks
numerous studies therefore seek to predict probabilities of bank default on the basis
of ￿nancial data.
These and most subsequent studies, such as Porath (2006), use a hazard model
that transforms a set of (mostly) bank-speci￿c covariates observed in year t into
the probability of default (PD) with an appropriate link function (such as logit or
probit). The PD can be estimated with historical data of the covariates x observed
in t and the actual state of default in t+1. The individual bank PD in a given year
PDit is the probability that bank i defaults within one year.
The de￿nition of bank defaults usually follows the conventions applied by regu-
latory authorities. For example, most U.S. studies de￿ne failure either as closure by
regulators due to capital ratios falling below 2 percent or a merger assisted by the
FDIC (Cole and Gunther, 1995). 2 Clearly, the de￿nition of bank default is crucial
since this is precisely the event of interest to policy makers and practitioners. In
contrast to non-￿nancial ￿rms, however, this de￿nition is non-trivial since outright
bankruptcies used in the latter type of studies are rare in banking. This is because
individual bank failures may disrupt trust in the system as a whole, which explains
why the industry is characterized by more intense regulation seeking to prevent
individual and systemic crises (Benink and Benston, 2005).
Failure de￿nitions are usually less obvious than they appear to be in the case
of U.S. banking. For example, in our data no single bank violated regulatory min-
imum capital requirements. But the scenario that no German bank was distressed
since 1993 seems unlikely. This ￿nding more likely indicates that bank distress is
signalled already before outright failure events occur, which in turn ignite measures
1Thomas.Kick@bundesbank.de (T. Kick) and m.koetter@rug.nl (M. Koetter). We are grate-
ful for comments received at the Stress Testing Workshop hosted by the Deutsche Bundesbank
and the NAKE conference hosted by the Dutch Central Bank. In particular, we thank Geraldo
Cerqueiro, Hans Degryse and Elmer Sterken for their feedback. We are also grateful to Frank Heid
for stimulating discussions and Ferre de Graeve, Rudi Vander Vennet and Volker Zeller for most
valuable comments. We thank the Deutsche Bundesbank for providing us with data. This paper is
part of a research project funded by the "Stiftung Geld und W￿hrung". The paper represents the
authors’ personal opinions and does not necessarily re￿ect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
All remaining errors are of course our own.
2FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Scheme.
1taken by market participants and/or regulators to forestall disrupting bank closures.
Therefore, observed failure events are usually unavailable for most banking markets
to the public. Many (non-U.S.) studies therefore resort to alternative de￿nitions.
For example, Dabos and Escudero (2004) analyze Argentinean bank failures de￿ned
as those that closed during the two year period following the Tequila crisis ignited
by the devaluation of the Mexican Peso on December 20th, 1994. This de￿nition is
problematic if some banks are taken over by competitors for entirely di￿erent rea-
sons than distress resolution, for example the existence of just favorable acquisition
conditions. In a study of German bank failures, Elsas (2004) de￿nes events on the
basis of persistent membership in the worst annual deciles of the banking popula-
tion’s loan-loss provision share distribution. This categorization is also troublesome
if probabilities of default are subsequently estimated with, among other factors,
credit quality for reasons of endogeneity.
These obstacles associated with the de￿nition of bank distress are, however, not
con￿ned to bank failure studies outside the U.S. as noted by Oshinsky and Olin
(2006). According to them, o￿cial failure is only one of many options how markets
and regulators deal with troubled banks in general. They report for a sample of U.S.
banks that troubled banking ￿rms merged, received capital assistances, recovered
or merely continued to exist as a troubled bank. In fact, only ￿ve percent of all
troubled banks in their sample were eventually closed. Other studies by Wheelock
and Wilson (2000), Worthington (2002), DeYoung (2003) and Koetter et al. (2006)
that allow for multiple distress and/or exit events con￿rm that troubled banks do
not face a dichotomous destiny limited to survival or failure only.
But to our knowledge neither of these studies account for the pecking order that
we hypothesize to exist between di￿erent states of distress when predicting bank
PD’s. Only one study by DeYoung et al. (2001) on U.S. bank ratings is method-
ologically related to ours. The authors compare supervisory CAMEL bank ratings
to the market’s evaluation inherent in subordinated debt risk spreads of the parent
banking ￿rm.3 For the case of U.S. banks, CAMEL ratings result from both o￿-site
￿nancial information as well as expert evaluations formed during on-site inspections
(King et al., 2005). Hence, the authors hypothesize that con￿dential CAMEL su-
pervisory ratings contain additional information compared to evaluations of other
market monitors, such as rating agencies. To extract the con￿dential, additional
information inherent in CAMEL ratings they use an ordered logit model to regress
publicly available ￿nancial information on these ratings. 4 DeYoung et al. (2001) ar-
gue that the residuals from this regression capture the private information available
to regulators due to on-site inspections. Subsequently, they analyze if and when
an option-adjusted risk premium on subordinated debt is adjusted for these added
information. They ￿nd that on-site inspections yield indeed additional information
that is at times priced only slowly into markets risk premia.
We argue that this and previous studies on bank failure su￿er from three prob-
lems that we seek to address in our study. First, any (CAMEL) rating results from
assigning (an) estimated (distribution of) probabilities of default to rating classes.
These classes are by de￿nition ordinally scaled. However, whether estimated proba-
bilities account for the ordinal nature of the observed event of interest depends on
3CAMEL: Capitalization, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity.
4CAMEL ratings range from 1 (least severe) to 5 (most severe).
2the previously discussed de￿nition of distress in the ￿rst place. While U.S. super-
visors’ CAMEL ratings may include valuable private information, it subsequently
represents an addition to explanatory variables in a dichotomous failure model in-
stead of a more di￿erentiated de￿nition of bank distress events on the left-hand side
(King et al., 2005). Second, the approach by DeYoung et al. (2001) to regress public
￿nancial information on con￿dential CAMEL ratings is infeasible for most European
banking markets since, in contrast to the U.S., the vast majority of banking ￿rms
are not traded publicly. Hence, most banks do not report ￿nancial statements, let
alone additional qualitative information, for example on asset quality, to the public.
Third, if distressed events are ordered events, it should be tested if not only inter-
cepts of estimated hazard functions capture increasing degrees of distress but also
if individual slope coe￿cients di￿er across distress categories. We seek to ￿ll these
gaps with our study on German universal bank distress using a generalized ordered
logit model.
We use a unique data set collected by the German central bank on a variety
of distress events experienced by universal banks between 1994 and 2004. We or-
der these records according to severity into four categories. The ￿rst and weakest
category I of distress includes compulsory noti￿cations of regulatory authorities as
stipulated in the German Banking Act ("Kreditwesengesetz, KWG" ).5 The second
distress category II comprises o￿cial warnings or disagreements of the regulatory
authority, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority ( "Bundesanstalt f￿r Finanz-
dienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin" ). The next distress category III are interventions by
the respective banking sector’s insurance scheme in the form of capital injections
as well as binding measures issued by the BaFin, for example restrictions to lend-
ing and deposit taking. We argue that in contrast to the former category, these
distress events represent an active intrusion into the management of the banking
￿rm that curbs perfectly free market competition. Finally, category IV comprises
distress events that entail the exit of a bank from the market, either through clo-
sure ignited by the regulator in charge, the BaFin, or through mergers classi￿ed
as restructuring mergers. The latter are usually ignited by the respective banking
pillars’ head associations (the German Savings and Giro Association, "Deutscher
Sparkassen und Giroverband, DSGV" and the Federal Association of Cooperative
Banks, "Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Rai￿eisenbanken, BVR" ).
We hypothesize that these four categories of events re￿ect fundamentally di￿erent
kinds of distress that require more explicit modeling. While the particular choice of
distress events here is in line with the institutional and regulatory regime prevailing
in German banking, we argue that the logic of di￿erent degrees of distress applies to
other banking systems, too: some banks catch attention by regulators for suboptimal
performance while others need to be closed or forced out of the market through
mergers to avoid jeopardy of the system’s stability.
Our results con￿rm that bank distress events can be modeled by the ordered logit
approach. Using both bank-speci￿c and regional macroeconomic covariates, we ￿nd
that distress is increasingly less likely for well-capitalized, pro￿table banks and more
likely for banks with low levels of total reserves and high shares of poor quality loans.
These ￿ndings are qualitatively well in line with previous studies on bank distress
(Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Porath, 2006; Koetter et al., 2006). However, our
5We introduce the institutional setting of German banking supervision in section 2.
3model improves on previous studies in three important respects. First, we ￿nd that
the proportional odds assumption implicit in traditional limited dependent analyses
of the banking industry is violated. Put di￿erently, the sensitivity of the respective
probabilities for a change in individual covariates is not identical for di￿erent kinds
of ordered distress events. For example, an increase in the capitalization ratio has a
strong reducing e￿ect on category I and II distress events. However, it is of minor
relevance to reduce the likelihood of more severe distress events. Second, our model
includes not only small savings and cooperative banks but also large banks from
all three banking sectors, commercial, savings and cooperatives. 6 Since especially
large banks did not experience absorbing failure events, such as closure or forced
takeovers, this important sector of the industry has not been analyzed previously.
Third, compared to most other bank failure studies, the accuracy of our model
to correctly classify (ordered) failures from non-failures is high. This supports our
argument to model di￿erent degrees of bank hazards more explicitly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brie￿y intro-
duce the institutional supervision setting in German banking. In section 3 we discuss
next our distress data, the choice and hypotheses regarding explanatory covariates
and present also our empirical model. We present major ￿ndings subsequently in
section 4 and conclude in section 5.
2 Institutional background
Despite ongoing harmonization since the late 1980’s the supervisory landscape in
European banking is still heterogenous (Carletti et al., 2006). In most countries a
single institution is responsible for banking supervision. This is usually the central
bank, which in turn is typically accountable to the Ministry of Finance (Barth
et al., 2001). In Germany, two institutions supervise banks. The ￿rst is the Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority ("Bundesanstalt f￿r Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,
BaFin") and the second is the German central bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank
(BBK).
The BaFin is responsible for all sovereign measures. This includes licensing
and potentially closing individual institutions, but also issuing general instructions
for carrying out banking business, providing ￿nancial services and limiting risks.
The Bundesbank is assigned most of the operational tasks in banking supervi-
sion. These are the issuing of principles and regulations, the process of ongoing
supervision (except individual regulatory measures vis-￿-vis institutions), pruden-
tial audits, international cooperation/coordination in the prudential ￿eld, and crisis
management. Especially through its ongoing monitoring activities using its network
of branches ("Hauptverwaltungen" ) across Germany, the Bundesbank collaborates
6This group includes the big ￿ve commercial banks, central cooperative and central savings
banks ("Landesbanken") since they operate on a(n) (inter)national basis and share more character-
istics across banking sectors compared to the pro￿le of their respective pillar’s smaller competitors
(Koetter et al., 2006).
4with the BaFin in the ￿eld of banking supervision (Deutsche Bundesbank and BaFin,
2002).
As a general rule of the Banking Act, the supervisory agencies should minimize
direct interference in the individual operations of ￿nancial institutions. An explicit
aim of the Banking Act is to leave the responsibility for business operations to
managers of the ￿nancial institutions. In general, banking supervision restricts the
activities of the ￿nancial institutions primarily by qualitative and quantitative gen-
eral provisions and requires banks to open their books to the supervisory authorities.
However, the BaFin may also decide to intervene more directly if deemed necessary.
On a regular and annual basis, all banks report balance sheets, pro￿t and loss
accounts as well as compulsory audit reports compiled by independent auditors
to the Bundesbank. In addition, Bundesbank auditors conduct less frequent on-
site examinations of banks. Violations of the Banking Act are forwarded by the
Bundesbank to the BaFin, which after examination formulates next steps to intensify
supervision or issue sanctions.7
The BaFin has a range of measures to intervene when a bank fails to meet
regulatory requirements or poses a threat to stability. Most of these measures are
of a warning nature, for example hearings of the banking board, admonishments
of executives or sending formal letters of warning. The BaFin can also issue more
strict interventions, such as prohibiting to grant new credit or ultimately to ignite
closure of the bank.8 Before such measures are applied, the institution is typically
given time to correct the de￿ciency. This gradual approach of intensi￿ed supervision
is exactly representative of ordered distress events banks can experience.
With or without having received warnings by the BaFin, banks may experience
further distress in the sense of receiving assistance by their respective sector’s head
organization. The three sectors, also known as banking pillars (Koetter et al., 2006)
are commercial, savings and cooperative banks, all of which maintain self-organized
insurance funds. Akin to capital injections to local U.S. banks through their bank
holding company (Oshinsky and Olin, 2006), the scheme of private commercial banks
(Deposit Guarantee Fund of the Federal Association of German Banks, "Einlagen-
sicherungsfonds des Bundesverbandes deutscher Banken" ), the head association of
savings banks (German Savings and Giro Association, "Deutscher Sparkassen und
Giroverband, DSGV" ) and cooperative banks (Federal Association of Cooperative
Banks, "Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Rai￿eisenbanken, BVR" )
may support troubled members by means of capital injections. 9 In addition, failure
to comply with earlier warnings issued by the regulator may lead to increasingly
binding sanctions such as for example the prohibition of pro￿t distributions.
In sum, banking supervision in Germany involves a tight network of regulators
from both the Bundesbank and the BaFin as well as the close involvement of the
respective banking sector’s head organizations and auditors. Bank distress occurs
7Note, however, that the banking act stipulates that the BaFin shall base its regulatory measures
on the Deutsche Bundesbank’s audit ￿ndings and appraisals.
8Technically, it is the bank itself that has to ￿le bankruptcy.
9Note that the scheme of private commercial banks entails deposit insurance while the latter
two involve a further reaching general insurance against bank insolvency ("Institutssicherung" ).
5in multiple shades, ranging from early warning signals igniting formal indication to
authorities required by law to forced closure by the BaFin. We discuss next our
empirical model to capture the order of these events, distress de￿nitions and our
choice of explanatory variables.
3 Methodology and data
Distress categories We collect data from records gathered by the Bundesbank about
distress events among universal German banks of all three sectors between 1994 and
2004. As stressed in section 2 it should be noted that these records do not represent
interventions of the Bundesbank itself. Rather, the data represent a comprehen-
sive collection of noti￿cations from banks as required by law, own records of the
Bundesbank regarding early warning signals on the basis of reported balance sheet,
pro￿t and loss account as well as audit report data, supportive actions taken by the
sectors’ head associations and ￿nally measures taken by the BaFin.
In addition to the ￿rst group of non-distressed bank year observations, we cate-
gorize four groups of distressed events of increasing severity. The respective distri-
butions over time are shown in table 1. The ￿rst group of weakest events comprise
three incidents. First, a decline of annual operational pro￿ts of more than 25 percent.
Second, a noti￿cation by banks of losses amounting to 25 percent of liable capital.
Third, noti￿cations by banks about events that may jeopardize the existence of the
bank as a going concern. The latter two incidents are compulsory noti￿cations as
stipulated in ￿29(3) and ￿24(1), respectively, of the Banking Act. None of these
events implies per se a change of the bank as a going concern. Distress events of
this category re￿ect instead the earliest signs of problems and are of of an indicative
nature.
The second category of distressed events captures measures taken by the BaFin
representing o￿cial warnings or disagreement. Hence, none of these measures implied
an active intrusion into the ongoing business operations of the bank. In total, our
data distinguishes 59 di￿erent kinds of measures. We allocate 26 to more severe
categories of events since they include the explicit prohibition of certain activities or
even closure of the bank. From the remaining 24 events around 80% involve one of
the four following measures: admonishment hearings, disapproval, warnings to CEO,
and serious letters.10
We regard these events as the second worst distress category since they re￿ect
corrective actions regarding management and business processes by means of warn-
ing the bank o￿cially. Note that we do not investigate here the appropriateness of
any such actions. Instead, we merely observe that a considerable number of banks
were subjected to such corrective actions. However, none of these implied an out-
right market distortion, such as a subsidy, but represent early warnings of o￿cial
disapproval.
10We neglect nine kinds of events either due to missing data or not representing distress, for
example the sending of regular letters.
6Table 1: Distribution of distress events 1995 to 2004
Year Distress category Total
0 I II III IV
1995 2,988 4 11 23 19 3,045
1996 2,965 4 12 37 22 3,040
1997 2,894 2 21 26 49 2,992
1998 2,773 4 39 36 53 2,905
1999 2,618 6 63 23 55 2,765
2000 2,447 3 54 24 43 2,571
2001 2,188 17 67 24 42 2,338
2002 1,993 24 67 17 32 2,133
2003 1,855 14 66 20 22 1,977
2004 1,784 8 45 15 6 1,858
Total 24,505 86 445 245 343 25,624
In contrast, our next distress category captures those incidents where the bank
either received support from their respective head association in the form of capital
preservation measures or was limited in it’s scope of operations by the BaFin. We
argue that the former kind of intervention is a more drastic class of distress since
it suggests that compliance with legal capitalization requirements was su￿ciently
endangered as to actively subsidize the bank. In addition, we classify the following
measures by the BaFin as category III distress events: orders to restructure opera-
tions, restrictions to lending, deposit taking, equity withdrawal or pro￿t distribution
and the dismissal of the Chief Operating O￿cer. These interventions represent ac-
tive intrusions into the ongoing management of the bank and thus represent severe
distress according to our de￿nition.
Our last distress category includes all those events which imply the bank to
cease as a going concern. This class comprises two events. The ￿rst are takeovers
classi￿ed by the Bundesbank as restructuring mergers. 11 These are usually ignited
by head organizations if alternative measures seem futile or if previous measures did
not improve the bank’s situation. The second class are enforced closures of banks
initiated by the BaFin, which are extremely rare. This ultimate level of distressed
events are absorbing incidents that cause the bank to terminate it’s operations and
exit the market.
Speci￿cation We thus want to estimate the probability P that the ordinal distress
indicator Y of bank i takes on the value j = 1,..,M, where M is the number of
event classes. To this end, Greene (2003) writes an ordered logit as
11Note that these mergers are not ordered but merely classi￿ed as such by the Bundesbank.
7P(Yi > j) = g(βXi) =
exp(αj + βXi)
1 + exp(αj + βXi)
, for j = 1,2,..,M − 1, (1)
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables for bank i and α and β are pa-
rameters to estimate. Note that this model nests the more commonly used logistic
regression model if M = 2 in equation (1). Moreover, if our categorization of dis-
tressed events indeed re￿ects increasing severity, we expect the j hazard functions
intercepts αj to exhibit increasingly large negative values (Greene, 2003).
An important assumption in this model that is usually only brie￿y mentioned is
the so-called parallel odds assumption. Note that in equation (1) only the constant
cut-o￿ parameters αj di￿er across distress categories. In turn, the slope parameters
of the link function are assumed to be identical. Put di￿erently, the e￿ect of a change
in Xi, for example pro￿tability or asset quality, is expected to have the same e￿ect
on the probabilities of weak distress incidents and forced closures, respectively. 12
Only few studies mention this assumption explicitly (Clogg and Shihadeh, 1994),
which in our case seems to be particularly inappropriate. Therefore, we follow the
suggestion of Williams (2006) and specify instead a generalized ordered logit model
(GOLT). This model allows not only for intercepts speci￿c to di￿erent categories j,
but also for alternative slope parameters:
P(Yi > j) = g(βjXi) =
exp(αj + βjXi)
1 + exp(αj + βjXi)
, for j = 1,2,..,M − 1. (2)
The respective probabilities that Yi will take on values j = 1,..,M are given by
P(Yi = 1) = 1 − g(β1Xi), (3a)
P(Yi = j) = g(αj−1 + βj−1Xi) − g(αj + βjXi) , for j = 2,..,M − 1, (3b)
P(Yi = M) = g(αM−1 + βM−1Xi). (3c)
Hence, the generalized ordered logit model is equivalent to a series of simple
logistic regressions that lump the ordered dependent variables’ categories into one.
In our case with M = 5, for example, category j = 1 is compared with categories
j = 2,..,4 as a reference group. Likewise, for j = 3 the comparison is between groups
1 through 3 relative to groups 4 and 5. 13 We test below whether the proportional
odds assumptions is (partly) violated and provide also a comparison of resulting PD
distributions from the most commonly employed logistic regression in comparison
12Clearly, the logistic regression model is even more restrictive since also the α’s are assumed to
be identical.
13Alternatively, one may model the events as a multinomial logit model, which also allows for
group-speci￿c slope coe￿cients (see for example Koetter et al. (2006) and Focarelli et al. (2002)).
Two drawbacks of this model are, ￿rst, the neglect of the ordinal nature of events and, second, a
larger number of parameters to estimate (Williams, 2006).
8to the (generalized) ordered logit models. Before turning to our results, let us turn
brie￿y to our selection procedure for the vector of explanatory covariates.
Explanatory variables To estimate respective probabilities of distress, we fol-
low the ￿nancial economics literature and select ￿nancial covariates resembling the
CAMEL pro￿le of the bank as well as macroeconomic covariates. Our selection pro-
cedure follows the suggestion of Hosmer and Lemshow (2000) and unfolds in short as
follows. First, we generate a long list of potential CAMEL candidates of around 150
covariates. Second, we shortlist around 50 covariates on the basis of univariate ex-
planatory power for both category-speci￿c and pooled failure events such that each
CAMEL category is covered. Next, we select a further reduced vector of covariates
with stepwise logistic regression. Finally, we select the ￿nal vector of covariates on
the basis of statistical and economic signi￿cance. This procedure leaves us with nine
covariates for which we depict mean values per event category in table 2. 14
Table 2: Mean values for CAMEL covariates 1995-2004
Distress category
Variable 0 I II III IV Total
Equity ratio c1 8.35 9.93 7.71 7.21 8.08 8.33
Total reserves c2 0.96 0.44 0.73 0.36 0.44 0.94
Risky loans a1 10.93 13.69 13.03 15.12 13.85 11.06
Customer loans a2 58.54 55.63 61.89 58.78 60.81 58.62
OBS activities a3 3.09 3.04 3.05 4.00 3.61 3.10
Cost e￿ciency m1 83.08 74.42 80.49 79.08 80.06 82.93
RoE e1 15.35 0.48 7.24 1.42 3.01 14.86
Liquidity l1 6.56 8.77 7.68 7.72 7.54 6.61
Insolvencies INS 0.86 1.24 1.04 1.12 0.88 0.87
Notes: All variables measured in percent. c1: Core capital to risk-weighted assets,
reserves to total assets, a1: Provisioned loans and loans with
increased risks to audited loans, a2: Customer loans to total assets,
a3: O￿ balance sheet activities to total assets, e1: Operating results to
balance sheet total, m1: Cost e￿ciency, l1: Net interbank assets and
cash to total assets, INS: Corporate insolvency ratio per state (’Bundesland’).
We expect that better capitalized banks are in general less prone to experience
distressed events. We therefore specify, ￿rst, the equity ratio and, second, the to-
tal reserve ratio. Especially the latter include in line with German accounting rules
14As in Koetter et al. (2006), we choose a lag of one period based on univariate explanatory
power. Qualitatively, results for lags of up to three years are not a￿ected.
9undisclosed reserves ("Stille Reserven" ) and we expect negative coe￿cients for both
variables. Next, we specify three variables to capture asset quality: the share of cus-
tomer loans, the share of risky loans and the share of o￿-balance sheet activities.
Compared to interbank or government loans, a larger share of customer loans ex-
poses the bank to higher credit risk (Porath, 2006). Clearly, a larger share of risky
loans should also increase cet. par. the likelihood of a bank to fail. Finally, o￿-balance
sheet activities comprise primarily credit commitments, which may bear risks if nu-
merous (large) customers draw simultaneously on these lines, for example due to
a common macroeconomic shock. Thus, we expect for all three that higher shares
increase the probability of distress and thus yield positive coe￿cients. Measuring the
managerial quality of the bank is di￿cult without on-site inspection and resulting
qualitative information. Many studies rely instead on cost-income ratios to assess
the ability of managers to minimize administrative expenses when generating rev-
enues. But as noted for example by Wheelock and Wilson (2000), high cost-income
ratios may merely indicate competitive markets where prices are driven towards
marginal cost. Then, cost income ratios contain presumably little information about
managerial quality. As an alternative o￿-site measure, we use cost e￿ciency scores
generated with stochastic frontier analysis. Assuming that markets are competitive,
ine￿ciency arises on the cost side if a bank employs too many input factors or wrong
proportions of di￿erent input factors. Such deviations would systematically lead to
higher than optimal cost. Consequently, we hypothesize that higher cost e￿ciency
reduces the probability of distress. The mechanics to obtain bank-speci￿c estimates
from this cost minimization model are provided in the appendix. We capture the
pro￿tability of banks by return on equity and account for their liquidity with the
ratio of cash and short run net interbank assets relative to total assets. To control
for (regional) macroeconomic conditions, we also include the corporate insolvency
ratio per federal state and expect that fewer troublesome customers also reduce the
distress probabilities of banks.
Only few banks in our sample experienced multiple events over time. Nonetheless,
we note that bank distress may very well depend on previous states of distress. 15
Therefore, we control for a bank’s previous state of distress by means of a memory
variable MEMj for j = 2,3,4.16 This is a dummy variable that takes on a value of
one if the bank experienced a (distressed) event j in it’s history.17 In addition, we use
a robust sandwich estimator that allows for dependence across yearly observations
per bank to obtain standard errors. 18
15The total number of distressed events of 1,119 (table 1) is distributed across 793 banks. 730
are subject to maximal two events during 1995 and 2004. The maximum number of multiple events
per bank is six, but applies only to one institute. Excluding banks with multiple events did not
a￿ect our results qualitatively.
16Note that group j = 1 comprise non-distressed bank years. Groups 2 through 4, in turn,
represent distress categories I to III.
17Obviously, absorbing distress events covered in category IV are not considered.
18Ideally, we could specify a generalized ordered logit model as a panel. However, to our knowl-
edge, no such estimator exists for polytomonous response models in general, let alone for the gener-
alized ordered logit. As an additional robustness check we follow Hosmer and Lemshow (2000) and
compare for each distress category results from binary logistic regressions with panel estimations
104 Results
We depict results from four hazard rate models in table 3. All four models are nested
in the generalized ordered logit model in equation (2). Consider ￿rst the simplest
case of a basic binomial logit model (column BLT), where all four distress categories
are pooled into one dichotomous dependent event. The discriminatory power of this
model is high as witnessed by a value of 0.804 for the Area Under the Receiver
Operating Characteristics Curve (AUR) and a pseudo R2 of 14.7%.19 Coe￿cient
estimates for the various components of banks’ ￿nancial pro￿les are highly signi￿-
cant and in line with both expectations and previous results in the literature. Better
capitalization, higher pro￿tability and e￿ciency as well as more favorable macroe-
conomic conditions all reduce the likelihood of distress. In turn, higher exposures
to customer credit and o￿-balance sheet activities, poor loan quality and excessive
liquidity holdings all imply a higher probability of distress. To evaluate the economic
signi￿cance of individual covariates e￿ects it may, however, be misleading to rely on
coe￿cient estimates alone. Hosmer and Lemshow (2000) suggest to consult instead
marginal e￿ects. Before doing so, we test whether this model is the most adequate
one available to draw inference.
for dichotomous responses and ￿nd hardly any qualitative di￿erence.
19AUR values measure the ability of the model to discriminate between event and control group
observations for a range of cut-o￿ probabilities from zero to one. Values around 0.7 are considered























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12Consider to this end next the ordered logit model depicted in column OLT.
Category speci￿c intercept estimates con￿rm that distress events among German
banks exhibit a pecking order of ascending severity. All four estimated intercepts
exhibit the expected order in terms of magnitude (Greene, 2003; Williams, 2006).
All estimated intercepts are signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero. More importantly, the
hypothesis of identical intercepts αj is also rejected. We report the according χ2 test
statistic as well as p-values from a Wald test of identical intercept coe￿cients in
the top panel of table 4. The six individual tests on signi￿cant di￿erence between
αj’s yield that di￿erences are unequal from zero. Finally, the hypothesis of joint
equality of individual intercept parameters is rejected, too. In sum, speci￿cation
tests support the use of an ordered logit model as opposed to the more commonly
employed binomial logit model.
Table 4: Speci￿cation tests for the generalized ordered model
OLT α1 α2 α3
α2 χ2 86.2
p-value 0.000
α3 χ2 542.5 455.3
p-value 0.000 0.000
α4 χ2 722.3 648.5 240.2
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
All αi identical 853.34
0.000
GOLT
Identical β’s χ2 372.24
p-value 0.000
Identical β’s and α’s χ2 811.83
p-value 0.000
PPOM
PPOM restrictions χ2 24.03
p-value 0.065
However, it remains at this stage unclear whether slope coe￿cients di￿er, too.
We consider it likely that, for example, an increase in the equity ratio a￿ects the
respective likelihoods of distressed events of di￿erent order to varying degrees. As
a next speci￿cation test, we thus allow all slope coe￿cients βj to vary across cat-
egories j = 1,..,5. Estimated coe￿cients from a generalized ordered logit model
(GOLT) are depicted for each category in the accordingly labelled columns in table
3. The direction of individual coe￿cients remains stable compared to the BLT and
OLT speci￿cation. To interpret individual coe￿cients note the varying categories
contrasted with each other for a change of individual covariates. For example, a co-
e￿cient β1 for equity of -0.045 implies that an improvement of equity ratios reduces
the likelihood of distress according to category I or higher relative to not experi-
encing distress. Likewise, β2 for equity ratios of -0.058 compares the likelihood of
13experiencing categories II through IV distress relative to no or only weakest distress
according to category I. The χ2 test statistics of joint identity of slope coe￿cients on
the one hand and of equal slope and intercept coe￿cients in the mid-panel of table
4 clearly reject these hypotheses at the 1% percent level, respectively. We conclude
that hazard rate models for German universal banks should account not only for
di￿erent degrees of distress but also for the varying e￿ects of changes in ￿nancial
pro￿les on these ordered distress categories.
Finally, note that some coe￿cients exhibit fairly small di￿erences in estimated
parameters across categories in table 3, for example return on equity and risky
loans. Therefore, we test the so-called partial-proportional odds assumption. The
null hypothesis is that some coe￿cients are equal across dependent categories while
other parts of the hazard function do di￿er. We test for all possible combinations of
individual coe￿cients if slope coe￿cients across categories are identical and identify
four coe￿cients, which can be restricted. 20 The resulting parsimonious model that
we use to draw inference restricts risky and customer loan shares as well as return on
equity and one memory variable to be identical across j = 1,..,5. The test statistic
at the bottom label of table 4 con￿rms that the partial proportional odds model
(PPOM) does not violate the assumption of non-equal slope coe￿cients for these
covariates at the 5% level.21
In sum, the ￿exible PPOM model adds important qualitative information. First,
we note that some covariates are only signi￿cant for the likelihood of weaker forms
of bank distress. Deteriorating equity ratios and lower cost e￿ciency decrease only
the likelihood of weaker distress events signi￿cantly. Likewise, corporate insolvencies
as a proxy for macroeconomic conditions seem helpful to indicate signals of early
and medium stress but do not help to explain ultimate bank failure in the form of
either takeovers or closure. Our results thus suggest that bank exit due to distress
depends to the largest extent on bank idiosyncratic factors while only weaker forms
of stress are more dependent on the business cycle.
Second, di￿erent elements of banks’ ￿nancial conditions are of varying impor-
tance depending on the severity of trouble. Estimated coe￿cients suggest that the
role of reduced total reserves is of increasing importance for worse degrees of distress.
In contrast, all other ￿nancial ratios that are also signi￿cant determinants of worst
case distress, exhibit a constant coe￿cient across all categories. This result implies
that banks on the brink of failure react more sensitive to a given deterioration of
reserves compared to banks in less troublesome states. This result is important to
improve our knowledge regarding which components of banks’ ￿nancial pro￿les to
20To conserve on space we do not provide all test statistics here. They are available upon request
from the authors.
21Note, that the log-likelihood for the PPOM is slightly worse compared to the most general
GOLT model. Presumably, the gain from more degrees of freedom is too small to compensate for
the information lost by imposing the restrictions. For example, the GOLT coe￿cients on risky
loans are almost all identical with the exception of β3. It depends hence on the signi￿cance level
chosen whether to impose the constraint in the PPOM or not. Here, we chose the 5% level to test
for imposable constraints. A more restrictive approach using the 1% level led as expected to fewer
restrictions and also a higher log-likelihood value of the PPOM compared to the GOLT.
14address when resolving the most troublesome situations in the banking system.
Third, an important additional determinant of distress in the subsequent period
is a bank’s history of trouble. On the one hand the weakest form of distress appears
to have no discriminatory power between further deterioration of distress versus
remaining in or below the current distress category. Potentially, this result suggests
that automatically ignited indications of trouble required by law contain only limited
information about the true state of the bank. On the other hand, both remaining
memory variables indicate that having experienced a distressed event of medium
order in the past increases the odds to be subject to an even higher order of stress for
a given ￿nancial pro￿le. This result suggests that once a bank is somewhat troubled,
a further deterioration of it’s ￿nancial position is more likely than not. Note, however,
that our approach here cannot fully explain what distinguishes troubled banks, which
manage to recover from those that do manage turning around the bank. 22
In sum, the parsimonious partial proportional odds model is well suited to esti-
mate di￿erent distress probabilities. But to assess economically signi￿cant determi-
nants of bank distress categories, we need to consider marginal e￿ects in addition
to estimated coe￿cients. We depict marginal e￿ects for each category j = 1,..5,
evaluated at the mean of x, in table 5.
We report marginal e￿ects as semi-elasticities δy/δlnx evaluated at the mean,
which are denoted in basis points in table 4. For example, a reported marginal e￿ect
of 0.96 for the equity ratio in group 0 implies an increase in the probability of
no-distress by 0.96 basis points due to a 1% increase in the ratio.
Our most important conclusion is that the economic importance of di￿erent com-
ponents of banks’ ￿nancial pro￿les di￿ers across distress categories. The changing
magnitude and signi￿cance of individual marginal e￿ects across distress categories
highlights that attempts of bankers and regulators to reduce the likelihood of distress
require a more di￿erentiated mix of measures to be e￿ective. Our results con￿rm
that total reserve holdings are of increasing importance to avoid absorbing events in
category IV, but have no signi￿cant contribution to avoid weakest distress. Strategies
aiming to increase pro￿tability are of importance for all four degrees of distress. 23
However, this appears particularly helpful in medium ranges of distress, while ￿nal
exit PDs can be reduced by as much as 0.88 basis points when reducing the share of
customer loans by 1%. Marginal e￿ects of the history of increasingly worse distressed
events appear to determine future trouble to a much lesser extent compared to the
previously reported coe￿cient estimates. While this underlines the importance of
not relying on the latter only to draw inference, this result also suggests some path
dependency for troubled banks.
The likelihood not to experience any distress event is most a￿ected by cost ef-
￿cient operations and few customer loans. An increase in either measure by one
22Such an analysis requires in our view not only a sole focus on troubled banks but also further
information on e.g. measures taken by di￿erent banks to recover. We consider this research question
out of the present paper’s scope and postpone the issue to future research.
23Since we report semi-elasticities on probabilities of distress, marginal e￿ects also di￿er for co-
variates with restricted coe￿cients (see equation (2)). These would only be identical when reporting
e￿ects on scores instead of PD.
15Table 5: Marginal e￿ects for the partial proportional odds model
Variable Category ¯ x
0 I II III IV
Equity ratio 0.96*** 0.15 -0.80*** -0.53 *** 0.22 8.327
Total reserves 1.67*** -0.13** -0.33*** -0.48 *** -0.73*** 0.937
Risky loans -0.55*** 0.04*** 0.27*** 0.10 *** 0.15*** 11.055
Customer loans -3.25*** 0.24*** 1.56*** 0.57 *** 0.88*** 58.623
OBS activities -0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.14 *** -0.02 3.100
Cost e￿ciency 2.57*** -1.21*** -1.05* -0.49 0.18 82.927
RoE 1.33*** -0.10*** -0.63 -0.23 *** -0.36*** 14.857
Liquidity -0.50*** 0.04*** 0.24*** 0.09 *** 0.14*** 6.610
Insolvencies -1.72*** 0.35*** 0.80*** 0.70 *** -0.13 0.869
MEM1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008
MEM2 -0.12*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.036
MEM3 -0.07*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.01 *** 0.03*** 0.038
Notes: marginal e￿ects evaluated at the mean as semi-elasticities δy/δlnx,
measured in basis points. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signi￿cant at the 10,5,1 percent
level, respectively.
percent, improves the probability of no-distress by 2.6 or 3.3 basis points. Other
crucial components of bank’s ￿nancial pro￿le that increase the likelihood of sta-
bility are capitalization, especially reserves, and pro￿tability. While better regional
macroeconomic conditions, measured by corporate insolvencies have a signi￿cant
impact on the probability of no-distress, the magnitude of marginal e￿ects sug-
gests that ￿nancial stability is primarily driven by bank-speci￿c factors. In line with
estimated coe￿cients not signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero, having experienced the
weakest kind of distress in the past does not in￿uence the likelihood of further failure
signi￿cantly. Early warning signals re￿ected by compulsory noti￿cations appear to
have little predictive power of more severe degrees of distress.
Despite statistically signi￿cantly di￿erent coe￿cients compared to more restricted
hazard models as well as economically signi￿cant marginal e￿ects, the usefulness of
the PPOM regarding rating banks in the industry may be doubted. One may argue
that the direction and magnitude of estimated coe￿cients reported for the binomial
and ordered logit models in table 3 does not di￿er substantially. For rating purposes,
it is therefore also interesting to compare resulting distributions of probabilities of
distress. Consider to this end ￿gure 1, which depicts box plots of the di￿erences
between probabilities of distress between the ordered and the partial proportional









































Large Banks Commercial Banks Savings Banks Cooperative Banks
Ordered Logit Model (OLT) vs. Partial Proportional Odds Model (PPOM)
Distress Category I Distress Category II
Distress Category III Distress Category IV
odds model.24
Figure 1 illustrates the added information in contrast to dichotomous hazard
rate models. The partially restricted generalized ordered model add allows us to
assess probabilities per distress category, which we depict here per banking group.
Predicted probabilities of distress di￿er up to 60 basis points between the preferred
PPOM and the less ￿exible ordered logit model with common slope coe￿cients.
Given an expected overall frequency of 4.4 percentage points (see table 1), this dif-
ference is economically signi￿cant and suggests a more di￿erentiated view of distress
when rating banks.
Consider also di￿erences in PD’s between models per banking group. It is ￿rst of
all important to note that for large banks both models do not yield very di￿erent
results. This is comforting since it implies that especially for this important group
of banks potential speci￿cation problems due to the neglect of di￿erent orders of
distress seem small.25
24We do not depict distributions of probabilities of distress for reasons of con￿dentiality.
25Note that this result merely re￿ects a similar appropriateness of both models to estimate
large bank distress. It need not imply that either is particularly suited. Given the low number
of observations of large banks in general and that of only few distressed events in particular, we
therefore caution to use only bank-speci￿c point estimates for large banks of either hazard model
to assess these bank’s riskiness. Instead, regulators are certainly well advised for this group to rely
17Di￿erences between models regarding local cooperative banks seem fairly mod-
erate since they do not exceed 25 basis points. However, even such a di￿erence in
PDs may already in￿uence a bank’s rating and thus re￿nancing cost substantially.
In turn, estimated PD di￿er the most for the group of commercial banks and, to a
lesser extent, for local savings banks. More speci￿cally, allowing hazard functions to
di￿er in individual covariate sensitivities yields markedly di￿erent PD for the worst
distress category. Since such absorbing distress events most likely cause the largest
cost to society, it seems conservative to avoid the danger of underestimating these
events. While di￿erences between OLT and PPOM are distributed rather symmet-
ric for savings banks, worst category distress PD for commercial banks seem more
often than not to be lower according to the more restricted OLT model compared
to the suggested PPOM. Hence, we deem it prudent to at least consider this model
in addition to more restricted hazard models when rating banks.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we suggest a generalized ordered logit model to estimate probabilities
of distress among German universal banks. Our sample includes commercial, savings
and cooperative banks that reported to the Bundesbank between 1994 and 2004. We
distinguish four di￿erent categories of distress events and group them in ascending
order of severity of distress: (i) compulsory information of regulatory authorities
about potential threats; (ii) warning measures issued by regulatory authorities; (iii)
capital injections by sector insurances and binding measures of regulatory authori-
ties; (iv) restructuring mergers and forced closure initiated by regulatory authorities.
We identify a vector of bank-speci￿c and regional macroeconomic variables that
predicts probabilities of distress with high accuracy. We test if the model can be
reduced to both a binary or ordered logit regression and reject both hypotheses.
Thus, our results support, ￿rst, the ordinal nature of di￿erent distressed events
and, second, the di￿erent sensitivity of given changes of banks’ ￿nancial pro￿les on
di￿erent events, respectively.
Our results suggest that loan quality, cost e￿ciency and capitalization are of
importance to explain weak orders of distress. However, deteriorating conditions
according to the latter two indicators have little explanatory power for more severe
distress events, which depend primarily on the former and total reserve holdings as
well as pro￿tability.
We also ￿nd evidence that banks with a history of ￿nancial trouble are signi￿-
cantly more likely to be distressed in the future, too. While having experienced only
the weakest form of bank distress appears to have little implications for future dete-
riorations of a bank’s stability, especially medium degree distress events in the past
contribute to larger probabilities of further distress. We conclude that it is di￿cult
to turn around a bank once certain degrees of distress have been surpassed. Thus,
on multiple sources of information, such as more intensive on-site examinations rather than o￿-site
rating systems in general.
18further research investigating the determinants of successful restructuring seems ap-
propriate.
Apart from statistically signi￿cant evidence on estimated parameters in line with
previous evidence on bank failures, our results for marginal e￿ects show that espe-
cially the total reserves ratio and the customer loans ratio are of high economic
signi￿cance. A one percent increase of the former decreases the likelihood to exit
due to failure by 0.73 basis points. Likewise, a one percent improvement in the share
of customer loans reduces this PD by 0.88 basis points. In turn, corporate insolvency
ratios that measure the health of the regional corporate sector have no signi￿cant
in￿uence on worst case distress events of banks. Hence, especially higher order dis-
tress events appear to depend only indirectly at best on (regional) macroeconomic
conditions.
Finally, our results pertain that the generalized ordered logit model’s predictions
di￿er at times substantially from restricted (ordered) logit analysis. We ￿nd that,
depending on banking group and distress category, estimated PDs between the two
models di￿er up to 70 basis points, which accounts for 20% of the observed mean
probability of distress. Moreover, our results highlight the foregone informational
value of less restricted models since individual covariates in￿uence di￿erent distress
events to varying extents. With respect to managing bank risks this ￿nding may be
useful for bankers and regulators.
In sum, the generalized model suggested in this paper allows a more di￿erentiated
view of distressed events in banking. Future hazard studies should consider to model
the pecking order of distress as well as di￿ering sensitivities to ￿nancial bank pro￿les
more explicitly.
196 Appendix: Cost e￿ciency estimation
To approximate the management qualities of banks we use the concept of X-e￿ciency
introduced originally by Leibenstein (1966) and applied to bank e￿ciency measure-
ment in a number of studies (Berger et al., 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Amel
et al., 2004). We assume that a bank k uses ￿xed assets x1, labor x2 and borrowed
funds x3 to produce three outputs: customer y1 and interbank loans y2 and ￿nan-
cial securities y3. If banks are price takers, they minimize cost C subject to given
input prices wi and production technology T(•), which depends on y, x, and further
controls z. Input prices are calculated as in Koetter (2006) per regional market: de-
preciation over ￿xed assets for w1, personnel expenses over full time equivalents w2
and total interest expenditure over total borrowed funds w3. To account for technical
change we further specify a general time trend t and include interaction terms with
outputs, input prices and controls. The solution to this cost minimization problem
yields an optimal cost functionC ∗ (w,y,z), which we estimate with the following
translog speci￿cation:
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τm lnymkt + θr lnzkrt + εk.
After imposing the necessary homogeneity and symmetry restrictions (Koetter,
2006), we estimate equation (4) as a stochastic cost frontier. Any bank k can deviate
from optimal cost due to random noise, vk, or ine￿cient use of in- and outputs, uk.
We specify a composed total error, εk. For a cost frontier ine￿ciency leads to above
frontier costs. Therefore, the total error is εk = uk + vk. The random error term vk
is assumed i.i.d. with vk ∼ N(0,σ2
v) and independent of the explanatory variables.
The ine￿ciency term is i.i.d. with uk ∼ N|(µ,σ2
u)| and independent of the vk. It
is drawn from a non-negative distribution truncated at µ. Descriptive statistics to
estimate equation (4) are depicted in table 6.
We obtain bank-speci￿c e￿ciency measures as suggested by using the conditional
distribution of u given ε (Jondrow et al., 1982). A point estimator of technical
e￿ciency is given by E(uk|εk), i.e. the mean of uk given εk. Cost e￿ciency per
bank and year is calculated as [exp(−uk)] and equals one for a fully e￿cient bank.
Likewise, CE of 0.9 implies that a bank could have produced an identical output
vector with 90 percent of actually incurred cost.
20Table 6: Bank production data of German universal banks 1994-2005
Variable SFA Mean SD Min Max N
Interbank loans y1 289.5 3747.5 0.001 146000 30,307
Customer loans y2 640.8 4901.0 0.002 210000 30,307
Securities y3 287.1 2667.4 0.003 130000 30,307
Price of ￿xed assets w1 14.6 5.4 5.059 75.71 30,307
Price of labor w2 50.7 7.1 30.157 97.81 30,307
Price of borrowed funds w3 3.5 0.6 1.776 5.55 30,307
Equity z 50.2 380.6 0.252 16100 30,307
Total operating cost TOC 66.2 548.1 0.261 22300 30,307
Notes: All outputs, equity and operating cost measured in millions of Euro; prices of ￿xed
assets and borrowed funds in percent; price of labor in thousands of Euro;
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